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Anthony W. Cyrnak* and Glenn B. Canner**
Credit insurance is a product that has been steeped in controversyfor
manyyears. This article examines severalissues surrounding the market-
ing and sale ofcredit insurance through a recent survey on consumer
experiences with the product. Survey findings indicate that credit insur-
ance is purchased frequently, that consumers generally do not feel
pressured into buying the product, and that consumers view credit
insurance quitefavorably. Past abuses in the marketingandsale ofcredit
insurance therefore may have been overstated or have declined in recent
years.
The sale of credit insurance in connection with
extensions ofconsumer credithas been a controver-
sial subjectfor many years. Soldby various types of
financial institutions and some retailers, credit
insurance is designed to repay a borrower's debt in
the event ofhis death ordisability. Credit insurance
has been controversial because of its alleged high
cost in many states and because of allegations of
abusive marketing and sales practices. The credit
insurance industry has responded to such criticisms
by arguing that rates are reasonable in view of the
circumstances under whichcredit insurance is sold.
Also, while acknowledging the existence of some
abusive practices in the past, industry representa-
tives argue thatmostabuses havebeeneliminatedin
recent years.
Credit insurance will likely remain a controver-
sial product. A strong rise in consumer debt during
the 1980s has caused both consumer advocates and
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some governmental authorities to take note once
again. Recently, the Federal Reserve's Consumer
Advisory Council, an advisory group consisting of
30 financial industry, regulatory, and consumer
representatives, expressed interest in credit insur-
ance practices and the attitudes ofborrowers toward
them. Also of late, mandatory competitive rate
bidding (for credit insurance) in Massachusetts has
been the object of intense scrutiny by industry
observers.! Pressures for greater banking deregula-
tion and attempts by some banking organizations to
gain permission to conduct specific new insurance
activities, such as underwriting and selling home
mortgage insurance, also have called attention to
insurance practices.2
Finally, considerable discussion has arisen con-
cerning an amendment to the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem's Regulation Y. This amendment eliminates a
longstanding requirement that bank holding com-
pany subsidiaries proposing to engage in the under-
writing ofcredit insurance demonstrate public ben-
efits in the form ofa rate reduction (see Box).
In view ofthe continuing interest in credit insur-
ance, it seems worthwhile to examine the nature of
this product and to review some of the issues sur-
rounding it. This paper also reports some new
evidence on the frequency of credit insurance pur-6chases, borrower perceptions about lender recom-
mendations to buy credit insurance, and overall
borrower attitudes toward this product. Based upon
these survey results, some inferences aredrawn as to
the likely validityofsome ofthe criticisms levied at
the sale ofthis insurance product.
Section I describes the nature and primary types
of credit insurance. Section II focuses on various
marketing and sales abuses (including tie-in sales)
thathave been alleged by some industry critics. The
third section presents an analysis ofthe results ofthe
1985 Federal Reserve Board survey of borrower
experiences with credit insurance. These results are
compared to those found in a similar Board-spon-
sored survey conducted in 1977.
Two important conclusions emerge from the
consumer surveys. First, consumers believe that
creditors base their decisions to grant credit on
factors other than consumer decisions whether to
purchase credit insurance. Second, consumers who
purchase credit insurance believe it is a valuable
product and would be inclined to purchase insur-
ance in the future. The final portion of the paper
summarizes the findings.
I. Credit Insurance
Credit insurance typically is sold to borrowers in
connection with the extension ofcredit by a lender,
usually a financial institution or retailer. It is
designed to ensure the repayment of a borrower's
debt in the event of death, disability or loss of
property. The types of credit extensions that are
usually covered include automobile loans, personal
loans, and installment purchases of appliances as
well as other consumer goods3. Generally, credit
insurance is sold to a lender by an insurance under-
writer on agroup basis. The lender holds the policy
and issues a certificate ofinsurance to any borrower
who purchases credit insurance. The lender is
named beneficiary and directly receives any pay-
ments made on submitted claims.
There are three basic types of credit insurance:
credit life, credit accident and health, and credit
property insurance. Credit life is the most com-
monly purchased type of credit insurance and
provides for the repayment ofa loan in the event of
the borrower's death. Credit life insurance first
appeared in the early 1900s to insure automobile
loans. Ittypically is written as declining term insur-
ance, that is, coverage decreases as the loan is
repaid. At the beginning of 1985, there were nearly
66 million credit life policies in existence in the
U.S. with in-force coverage of$190 billion.4
Accident and health insurance (A&H) is also
known as credit disability insurance. A&H credit
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insurance is designed to repay a borrower's debt in
the event ofa loss ofincome due to illness orinjury.
A&H credit insurance entails greater risk of loss to
the underwriter and is more difficult to administer
than credit life. Consequently, it is more costly to
offer than credit life insurance. Borrowers may be
required to be employed at the time that coverage is
extended and usually face restrictions concerning
pre-existing health conditions. Frequently, A&H
policiesfeature a "retroactive" clausethatrequires a
borrower to be disabled for a specified time before
insurance payments begin. Once this time require-
mentis met, however, insurancepayments are made
retroactively to the first day ofdisability.
A third type ofcredit insurance is credit property
insurance, which provides coverage for personal
property purchased with a loan. It may also insure
collateral property.
Credit insurance policies are written by various
types ofinsurance companies. Those that deal pri-
marily in credit policies are known as "specialty"
companies and are the largest issuers of credit
insurancepolicies. Asecondtypeofcreditinsureris
a "captive" insurer - a firm that is owned by a
single creditor or group of creditors through a sec-
ond company, usually a "reinsurer." A third type of
creditinsureris the general orfull-line lifeinsurance
company.II. Credit Insurance - Consumer Issues
Credit insurance, particularly credit life insur-
ance, has characteristics that distinguish it from
other types ofinsurance. For example, unlike regu-
lar life insurance, it is made available in small
amounts ofcoverage, and its premium rate does not
depend on the insured's age or health (although
credit life insurance is usually not made available to
borrowers over the age of65). It is usually sold by
the creditor directly at a premium rate that is con-
stantregardlessofthe sizeofthe loan orits maturity.
Generally, no proof of insurability is required, and
credit insurance usually cannot be cancelled. As a
result ofthese characteristics, credit insurance may
offerimportantadvantages to certainborrowers who
find it to be a convenient and economical way to
purchase protection against debt default.
Industry critics, however, contend that while
credit insurance offers borrowers some advantages,
its sale has often been associated with abusive and
even illegal practices. Their criticism has centered
on several issues including the cost ofcredit insur-
ance and the manner in which credit insurance has
been marketed and sold. These issues present diffi-
cult questions, and they warrant further discussion.
Credit Insurance Rates
One important concern ofindustry critics is that
credit insurance is relatively expensive, particularly
in comparison with other types ofinsurance such as
term life insurance. Lenders and insurers have
responded by arguing that the circumstances in
which credit insurance is sold justify higher pre-
miumrates. They argue thatthe administrative costs
of providing credit insurance are high compared to
other forms ofinsurance. Indeed, the small average
size ofcredit insurance policies and the presence of
some fixed costs in administrating and servicing
policies suggests that there may be some validity to
this point. Also, they argue that credit insurance
sales are subject to an "adverse selection" process
that permits purchasers of varying ages to obtain
credit insurance at the same premium rate. Typical
term life policies account for variations in risk by
charging different rates to individuals with different
risk profiles (for example, different ages, health,
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sex, marital status, or different personal habits such
as smoking or nonsmoking.)
The cost issue does not lend itself to an easy
resolution. Most observers agree that credit insur-
ance rates should be set at a level that will allow for
the payment of claims, provide reasonable lender
compensation, and ensure normal profits to insur-
ance underwriters. To achieve these goals, the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners
recommends that states set prima facie maximum
rates at levels that will generate a target "lossratio"
(ratio ofpremiums paid out to premiums collected)
of60 percent. Maximum allowable rates for credit
life insurance (and actual loss ratios), however, vary
widely, ranging from as much as $1.00 per hundred
dollars of insurance in some states to as little as
$0.28 per hundred dollars in others.
Wide variations in maximum allowable credit
insurancerates among states, moreover, are notwell
explained by what are believed to be only minor
differences in the costs of providing insurance in
different states. Rather, industry critics contend that
the allegedly highprimafacie rates found in certain
states result from several factors, including alack of
organized consumer pressure for lower rates, a low
level of concern by state insurance regulators,
strong industry lobbies that seek to maintain exist-
ing rate structures, and market conditions that are
perceived as conducive to noncompetitive pricing
behavior.
The level at which legal maximum rates are set is
a concern because in most states lenders tend to
charge the highest rate permitted. This practice
exists becauselenders are typicallycompensatedfor
credit insurance sales by receiving a portion ofthe
collected premiums (up to 60 percent in some
states). Although state laws generally limit the size
ofthis commission and prohibit lenders from mark-
ing up the cost of insurance to borrowers, lenders
(by sharing in the premiums collected) as well as
insurers profit from charging higher premiums.
Lenders have the ability to charge maximum
allowable rates only when borrowers have an inelas-
tic demand for credit insurance since revenue to the
lender would then increase as price rises to the stateceiling rate. This demand inelasticity might derive
from several sources. Borrowers may be unaware of
alternative sources of credit insurance or of sub-
stitute products (such as increasing existing life
insurance coverage). Inelastic demand alsocouldbe
the result of a desire to minimize search costs for
alternative sources ofcredit insurance - especially
since the costofcredit insurance typically accounts
for a small proportion oftotal loan costs.
Tying Arrangements and Credit Insurance
A second majorissue that surrounds credit insur-
anceis thatof"tie-in" sales betweenthegrantingof
creditand the saleofcreditinsurance. Tie-insalesor
"tying arrangements" occur when the purchaser of
some product (the tying good) agrees oris required
to purchase a second good (the tied good) from the
selleras aconditionto thepurchaseofthe first good.
Involuntary tie-ins through explicit contractual
arrangements are generally prohibited under
various federal laws including Section 3 of the
Clayton Act, Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, andSection 106ofthe BankHoldingCompany
Act.
The economic rationale for tying arrangements
has been explored thoroughly in the antitrust litera-
ture by such authors as Singer, Scherer, and
Edwards.5 This literature argues that tying arrange-
ments may accomplish several objectives for the
seller. One, firms may realize sales economies by
distributing tied products together. Two, tying
arrangements have been used to protect the reputa-
tionofafirm's products byensuring thatcompatible
jointinputsare used inproductionprocesses. Three,
tying arrangements have been used to circumvent
price controls such as usury restrictions on con-
sumer finance rates.6
Inthecaseofcreditinsurance, muchofthedebate
over tie-ins centers on whether the tying of credit
andcredit insurance is due to a lack ofcompetition.
That is, under what conditions can lenders coerce
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borrowers into purchasing credit insurance by
threatening, either explicitly or implicitly, to with-
hold credit unless the borrowers also buy credit
insurance? Eisenbeis and Schweitzer have argued
that such coercion is likely to be more successful in
markets where lenders enjoy some degree of
monopoly power in the granting of credit.7 An
example of such a market might be one that
ex.hibited high concentration, had few lenders,
maintained restricted entry conditions, and pre-
sented high search costs for alternative sources of
credit.8
Other Consumer Issues
Some ind1lstry observers have criticized other
aspects of the marketing and sale of credit insur-
ance. They argue that the extent of coverage has
frequently been misrepresented to consumers. In
addition, they allege that consumers have suffered
from fraudulent and deceptive claims practices
(such as not being provided a copy ofthe insurance
policy or being subject to an extremely narrow
definition of "disability"). They also argue that
credit insurance often is sold in excessive amounts,
such as when creditors base the amount ofcoverage
on the sum of monthly payments ("gross
coverage") rather than the outstanding principal
balance ("net coverage"). At present, few states
require coverage to be made on a net basis.
Critics also arguethatcoveragesometimes is sold
for periods that exceed the term ofthe loan and that
unearned premiums often are not refunded when
loans are prepaid or refinanced. These and other
abuses have been discussed more extensively in a
numberofprevious studies ofcreditinsurance prac-
tices.9 While theextentofthesepracticeshas always
been a matter of intense debate, examples from
several recent court cases provide some evidence
that they exist. 10III. Studies of Credit Insurance
Credit insurance has been discussed widely but
has been the subject of relatively few empirical
studies. Important studies of credit insurance
includeefforts by the National Association ofInsur-
ance Commissioners (NAIC, 1970), Hubbard
(1973), Huber (1976), and Eisenbeis and
Schweitzer (1979).11 The NAIC study surveyed
state insurance regulators and reported on the fre-
quency of consumer complaints arising from coer-
cive selling practices. A more comprehensive study
conducted at Ohio University (Hubbard) attempted
to determineconsumerattitudes toward creditinsur-
ance and the extent to which consumers may have
been pressured into buying it. A consumer survey
was used to identify consumer perceptions about
tie-in sales ofcredit insurance. Huber, in an exam-
ination of the sale of credit insurance by retailers,
focused on thedemand for creditinsurance and how
it varies by different groups ofconsumers.
The most comprehensive empirical study of
credit insurance tie-in sales was the 1979 study by
Eisenbeis and Schweitzer. Using the results of two
surveys - one ofconsumers and the other of bank
holding companies - the authors constructed an
analytical framework that enabled the existence of
tie-in insurance sales to be revealed by a high
proportion of joint purchases of credit and credit
insurance, by borrower perceptions of and resent-
ment at being forced to make insurance purcnlasles,
and by creditor conduct that is thought to promote
tying arrangements.
The study found that a rel:ltivelv
of borrowers purchased credit insurance but that
these high penetration rates probably did not indi-
cate coercion. Their conclusion was based upon
generally favorable consumer perceptions ofcredit
insurance and the low reported incidence ofsurvey
responses that indicated that credit insurance had
been required or strongly recommended. In addi-
tion, an examination of insurance selling practil:es
by bank holding companies revealed procedures
that seemed to make coercive selling practices
unlikely.
10The 1985 Survey
The Eisenbeis-Schweitzer study (1979) was
basedprimarily ontheresultsofthe 1977Consumer
Credit Survey. Sponsored by the Board of Gover-
norsoftheFederalReserve System, theOfficeofthe
Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, that survey col-
lected detailed information on the credit insurance
experiences of approximately 2,500 families
selected to be representative ofall families residing
in the United States.
InDecember 1985, the Federal Reserve Board, at
the request of the Consumer Advisory Council
(CAC), sponsored credit insurance questions on the
University of Michigan monthly Survey of Con-
sumer Attitudes. The CAC request was based on a
perception that substantial changes may have taken
place in the credit insurance market in recent years.
The 1985 survey examined consumer experiences
with credit insurance and contains the responses of
652 representative U.S. families reporting at least
one nonmortgage closed-end loan. 12
This paper reports the resultsofthe 1985.s11rvey
and compares some ofthose results to those ofthe
1977 survey. The analytical approach used to inves-
tigatethe seriousnessofconsumerabusesinthe sale
ofcredit insurance·is the same as that developed in
the Eisenbeis-Schweitzer study. In this approach,
the presence ofexcessive costs orunfair or abusive
sales practices, including coercive tying arrange-
ments, would be revealed by adverse consumer
experiences and attitudes of resentment toward
credit insurance.
Within the Eisenbeis-Schweitzer framework,
consumer surveys help to determine whether credit
insurance is purchased even though it is viewed
1112unfavorably. Moreover, high sales penetration rates
among borrowers may be a signal that involuntary
tying is occurring ifitis accompanied by consumer
perceptibns of coercion. The following, therefore,
specificallyexarmnes the frequency ofcredit insur-
ance purchases, borrower perceptions of creditor
recommendations to buy insurance, and consumer
attitudes toward credit insurance.
FrequencyofCreditInsuranceinConsumer
Loan Transactions
The December1985 survey indicates that slightly
less than two-thirds (64.7 percent) ofall borrowers
purchased credit insurance to cover their most
recent closed-end consumer loan with regular
monthly payments of at least $25 (see Table 1).13
Thepercentage ofcreditinsurancebuyerscompares
to a nearly equivalent 63.9 percent in 1977, and
indicates that consumers continue to be frequent
buyers ofcredit insurance. 14
As iJ)dicatedby the smaller proportion of"don't
know"responses, borrowersinthe 1985 surveyalso
seemed to be more aware of whether they actually
purchased credit insurance than their 1977 counter-
parts. Critics frequently argue that the sale ofcredit
insuranceoftenis "buried" withinloandocumenta-
tion to such an extent that consumers do not know
that they are purchasing credit insurance. In 1985,
only 2.2 percentofall borrowing families reported
that<theydid not knbwwhether.they .had credit
insurance coverage on their outstanding loan. This
contrasts with nearly 6 percent of borrowers in
1977. The explanation for this statistically signifi-
Callt improvement in awareness is a matterofspec-
ulation, but it could be related to efforts by·con-
sumeradvocacygroups •and state insurance
regulators to promote more open marketing prac-
tices. It could also be attributable to the effects of
Regulation Z which requires borrowers to sign a
statement indicating their desire to purchase credit
insurance.15
Animportantissueregarding creditinsurance has
been that ofpenetration rates - the percentage of
qualified borrowers who actually purchase credit
insurance. Concern has focused on the possibility
that high penetration rates may indicate successful
coercion. Boththe 1977 and 1985 surveys collected
informationonpenetrationrates bytype ofcreditor,
and found·that the purchase ofcoverage was most
common for loans obtained from finance com-
13panies. In 1985, for example, 69.7 percent of
finance company borrowers were covered by some
type ofcredit insurance. Penetration rates for com-
mercial banks and savings institutions were nearly
as highat67 percent. Credit insurance sales appear
tobelessfrequent for creditunions (61 percent) and
forretailers,dealers, andcontractors(52.4percent),
probably because fewer such lenders offer credit
insurance.
One of the more interesting aspects of credit
insuranceisthetendencyofpenetrationrates to vary
according to income class and education (Table 2).
The 1985 dataindicate that higherincome ($35,000
or more) and better educated (at least a high school
diploma) borrowers were less likely to have credit
insurance than other borrower groups. These find-
ings seem reasonable given that individuals with
more education and higher annual incomes typ-
ically have greater net worth on which to rely in
emergencies andare more likely to have otherforms
ofinsurance.
Forexample, information obtainedfrom the 1983
Survey ofConsumer FinancesI6 indicates that only
55 percentoffamilies with incomes below $15,000
in 1983 were covered by some type oflife insurance
plan. In contrast, 94 percent of families with
incomes above $35,000 had such coverage in that
year. High income individuals may also be per-
ceivedas bettercreditrisks, andthus may be subject
to less pressure to purchase credit insurance.
Mostborrowers who buy credit insurance obtain
it from their lender. In 1985, 90 percent of bor-
rowers with credit insurance reported that they
obtained the insurance from the lender (Table 3).
Among such borrowers, the two most frequently
cited explanations for this selection were conve-
nience and availability. Among borrowers who
obtained insurance from a source other than the
creditor, the principal reason cited for their choice
was familiarity (prior experience) with that insurer.
There was a small but statistically significant
increase fr6m 2 percent in 1977 to 10.1 percent in
1985inthe proportion of borrowers who reported
that they obtained credit insurance from someone
otherthan the creditor. This suggests that borrowers





Credit insurance industry critics claim that the
strong tendency for borrowers to purchase credit
insurance from theirlender is evidence ofcoercion.
To evaluate this claim, the 1985 survey collected
information on consumer perceptions of creditor
recommendations on the purchase ofinsurance.'
The 1985 survey (Table 4) indicates that 20.1
percent ofborrowers with credit insurance have the
impression that credit insurance was eitherrequired
or strongly recommended by their creditor. In
marked contrast, 39.3 percent of credit insurance
purchasers in 1977 thought that the creditor either
required or strongly recommended the purchase of
creditinsurance.I?
Requiring credit insurance, however, does not
necessarily indicate the existence of illegal
behavior. In many states, creditors may legally
require the purchase ofcredit insurance as a condi-
tion to receiving credit. They may not, however,
require that such insurance be purchased from a
particular source (especially the creditor). Further-
more, the cost ofcredit insurance must be reflected
in the calculation of the loan's annual percentage
rate. 18
Table 5 suggests that customers of finance com-
panies more frequently believed credit insurance to
be required than borrowers obtaining credit
elsewhere. Comparison ofthese data with the 1977
survey indicates virtually no change in the propor-
tion of finance company borrowers who reported
that the purchase of credit insurance was required
(data not shown in tables).
To gain further insight into the question of
whether borrowers are subjected to undue pressure
by creditors to purchase insurance, survey respond-
ents were asked whether they felt their decision to
purchase credit insurance made a difference in
whether the creditor would grant the loan (bor-
rowers who reported that credit insurance was
required were not asked this question). In 1985,
borrowers with credit insurance and those without
it, held similar views. Overwhelmingly (approx-
imately 95 percent), borrowers expressed the belief
that their decision regarding the purchase of credit15insurancehad no effect on the creditor's decision to
grant the loan (Table 6). These results strongly
suggest that most borrowers did not feel pressured
by.lenders into purchasing credit insurance as a
condition for obtaining credit. Moreover, com-
parisonsbetweenthetwo consumersurveys indicate
that significantly fewer borrowers in 1985 than in
1977believed that the creditor's decision to grant
creditwl:lS affectedbytheirchoice ofwhetherornot
to.purchasecredit insurance (Table 6).
Borrower Attitudes Toward Credit Insurance
As noted, survey findings that the purchase of
credit insurance was required by some creditors do
not provide direct evidence of the existence of
illegal tying practices. Nonetheless, survey infor-
mation can be used to explore whether respondents
perceivedthatlendersexertedpressurestoengagein
involuntary tying. Specifically, since coercive pres-
sures are likely to generateresentmentby borrowers
16toward credit insurance, survey responses could
reveal such adverse reactions. Adverse reactions
also mightbeexpected ifborrowers felt thatthe cost
of credit insurance was excessive, or if lenders
engaged in any ofthe abusive sales practices cited
earlier.
Borrowers were questioned about their general
attitude toward the purchase of credit insurance in
both the 1985 and 1977 surveys. Both sets of
responses indicate that about 90 percent of all
borrowers who were covered by credit insurance
thought buying the insurance was a "good idea"
(Table 7). Only 5.2 percent ofborrowers who had
credit insurance in 1985 thought that it was a "bad
idea" to purchase such insurance. Even among
borrowers without coverage, 56 percent in 1985
stated that its purchase was a "good idea."
A cross-tabulation of consumer attitudes toward
creditinsurance with selectedfamily characteristics
indicates that few differences exist in responses
among different subgroups offamilies (Table 8). In
nearly all categories, 90 percent or more of the
respondents with credit insurance exhibited a favor-
able attitude toward the purchase of credit
insurance.
Finally, to evaluate furtherconsumerperceptions
about the purchase of credit insurance, each bor-
rower with creditinsurance was askedwhethertiley
wouldbe inclinedto purchasecreditinsuranceinthe
future. Ninety-four percent ofthe respondents indi-
cated that they would be inclined to purchase credit
insuranceagain (Table 9). The mostfrequently cited
reason (mentioned by 83 percentofrespondents) for
such a preference was that credit insurance serves a
valuable purpose.
17IV..Summary and Conclusion
This study hasreviewed someoftheissues that
surround credit insurance, including·claims of
excessive ••cost .•andabusivetnarketingand.sales
practices, such as tie-in sales. While the. study
provides no directevidence on the validity ofsuch
criticisms, it does provide evidence on recent bor-
rowerexperienceswith, andattitudes toward,credit
insurance. Itis reasonableto.assulle•that the pres-
ence ofexcessive costs or abusive selling practices
would be reflected in borrower expressions ofdis-
satisfaction with or resentment toward credit
insurance.
Thestudyisbasedprimarilyonevidencefrom the
University of Michigan·Survey of Consumer Atti-
tudes that was conducted in December 1985. This
survey provides information on the frequency of
borrower purchases of credit insurance, borrower
perceptions about lender recommendations to buy
credit insurance,and overall borrower attitudes
toward.credit insurance.• Results.frol11 this •.survey
were analyzed and comparedtothose of a similar
1977 survey sponsored by the Federal Reserve
Board.
Theresultsofthe 1985 survey indicatethatnearly
two-thirds of families that borrow, ••purchase credit
insurance;furthermore,mostpurchasers viewcredit
insurance favorably.•.The.survey reveals that about
one-fifth ofborrowers who purchased creditinsur-
ance .believed such coverage was required or
strongly recommended.by the creditor. However,
exclUding borrowerswhosaidtheywererequiredto
purchase cre<;lit insurance, few believed that their
decision to purchase ornot to purchase creditinsur-
ance had any effectonthe lender's decision to grant
credit.
The 1985 survey found that the large proportion
of borrowers who were aware that they had pur-
chased credit insurance has not changed in recent
18
years. However, significantly fewer borrowers sur-
veyed in1985 were unaware of whether they actu-
aUypurchasedcreditinsurance than werein1927.
The decline in the number of such unaware bor-
rowers may help alleviate concerns. aboutthe
alleged sales practiceof"burying" credit insurance
within the loan document.
The1985 survey a1sofound a significant decline
in the proportion ofborrowers with credit insurance
who felt that the insurance was either required or
strongly recommended. Although this decline must
be interpreted with caution (some states permit
creditors to require the purchase of credit insur-
ance), itmay beevidence offewer involuntarycredit
insurance tie-in sales. This conclusion is supported
by additional survey results that indicate that in
1985, 94 percentofborrowers with credit insurance
felt thattheirdecisionto buy creditinsurancehad no
effect on the creditor's decision to grantcredit. This
compares to 80 percent in 1977.
Finally, the 1985 surveyrevealed that nine-tenths
ofborrowers who bought credit insurance thought
the purchase was a "goodidea,"and would buyit
again. Among borrowers who purchased credit
insurance, therewas littIechange in attitudesto\Vard
the desirability ofcredit insurance between 1977
and 1985. These findings are consistent with the
view that creditors in general do not subjectbor-
rowers to undue pressure purchase a product
(credit insurance) that they donot want.
Overall, the 1985 survey results suggest thatthe
widespread.abuses alleged by industry critics<are
not perceived by most borrowers as important con-
cerns.Thus, although this study does not contend
that allpastcriticisms ofthe.creditinsurance indus-
of such abuses has declined or may have been
overstated.FOOTNOTES
1. On May 10. 1984, the Massachusetts Banking Depart-
ment implemented Regulation 209 CMR 2.00 (Mass. Reg.
No. 415). This regulation requires state-chartered savings
banks, cooperative banks, credit unionsand trusts to seek
arl~ast three bidsfrom insurers and to accepUhEilowest
qualified bid for the provision of credit insurance to loan
customers. Federally chartered banks, finance com-
panies, and automobile dealers are exempt from this
regulation.
2. Application byCiticorp, NewYork, New York, pursuant
to section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act, to
engage in the underwriting of home mortgage redemption
insurance; approved by the Board of Governors of the
Federal ReserveSystem (March, 1986).
3. Credit insurance is available for virtually all kinds of
consumer credit. However, unlike credit insurance for
consumer installment loans, which usually is sold directly
by the loan officer or retail merchant, credit insurance for
home purchase loans and creditcardstypically is solicited
by mail by parties unrelated to the creditor.
4. Credit life insurance is a relatively small segment of the
life insurance industry. At the beginning of 1985, credit life
insurance policies accounted for approximately 17 per-
centofthe numberofall life insurance policies (issued and
in force in the U.S.) but only three percent of the amount of
coverage in force. Similarly, premium receipts from cre.dit
life insurance policies accounted for only four percent of
total life insurance premiums.
5. See, for example, Eugene Singer, AntitrustEconomics:
Selected Legal Cases andEconomic Models (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1968); Frederick Scherer, Indus-
trial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Chi-
cago: Rand McNally, 1970); and Franklin R. Edwards,
"Economics of 'Tying' Arrangements: Some Proposed
Guidelines for Bank Holding Company Regulation," Anti-
trust Law and Economics Review, Vol. 6, 1973.
6. See Scherer for a discussion of the advantages oftying
arrangements, pp. 505-507.
7. Robert A. Eisenbeis and PaUl R. Schweitzer, "Tie-Ins
Between the Granting of Credit and Sale of Insurance by
BankHoldingCompanies and Other Lenders," StaffStudy,
101, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(February 1979).
8. It is not clear, however, that the monopoly extension
argument provides a satisfactory explanation for the
apparenttying ofcredit and insurance. In the casewhere a
lender has some degree of monopoly power in the market
for, say, consumer loans, it is questionable that the lender
could increase profits by "forcing" borrowers to pay an
above-market price for insurance which otherwise is sup-
plied competitively. One reason is that such an arrange-
ment would reduce the demand for loans and, thus, the
interest rate on loans would have to be lower. It is by no
means a straightforward proposition that the higher
income on credit insurance would more than offset the
reduced income from lending. (For a firm with monopoly
power, tying arrangements could comprise a convenient
means of price discrimination according to the difference
in demandforthemonopolized good. In such acase, there
could be gains if the tied good is otherwise competitively
supplied. Critics of credit insurance tying arrangements,
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however, have not argued that lenders have used credit
insurance to price-discriminate among borrowers.)
The more likely situation that would be consistent with
the Eisenbeis-Schweitzer position is that the conditions
thatlend themselves to aless competitive loan marketalso
result in some. degree of monopolypower for providers of
credit insurance. Ifthis were the caSe, the provision of
credit and credit insurance by the same firm could.be
accounted for by costadvantagesconnected with the joint
production ofthetwoservices. That is, itischeaperfor one
firm to provide credit and insurance to a customer than to
have the customer contract with two different firms.
To the extent that there are cost advantages to jointly
producing credit and certain insurance services (e.g.,
insurance brokerage services), they should applyregard-
less.of the degree ofcompetition in a given mark~t. Thus,
even in highly competitive markets, credit and insurance
brokerage services cou.ld be supplied by individual firms.
Indeed, given these efficiencies, we would expect to
observe borrowers obtaining credit and insurance ser-
vices from the same firms. Explicit or implicit enforcement
of tying arrangements would not be needed. The cost
advantages of joint production, however, do not rule out
the possibility that the market for credit insurance itself
necessarily will be competitive. Therefore, the earlier dis-
cussion suggesting higher-than-competitive rates on
credit insurance coverage is consistent with th~ existence
of efficiencies in the joint provision of credit and credit
insurance.
9. See, for example, National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, "ABackground Studyofthe Regulation of
CreditLife and Disability Insurance," (Milwaukee: Execu-
tive Secretary of NAIC, 1970). Also, Joel Huber, "Credit
Insurance on Retail Purchases: What Does the Public
Feel?" Cambridge Reports, Second Quarter, 1976;
Charles L. Hubbard, ed., Consumer Credit Life and Dis-
ability Insurance (Ohio University, College of Business
Administration, 1973); Tracy Dobson, "Credit Insurance:
The Hidden Insurance," Michigan Bar Journal, February
1986.
10. Recent evidence of credit insurance abuses is
provided by a June 1985 settlement agreement between
Thorp Loan and Thrift Company and the state of Min-
nesota. The agreement required the finance company to
refund nearly $7 million in premiums to borrowers who
were subjected to abusive marketing practices in which
insurance coverages were added to consumers' loans
without their knowledge or consent.
11. See footnote 8.
12. The respondents were selected in a way that ensures
that they are representative of all U.S. families residing in
the 48 contiguous states. Telephone interviews were con-
ducted with the family member determined to be most
financially knowledgeable.
13. The survey excludes mortgage loans, credit card
debts and other loans with irregularpayment schedules. In
1985, 17.6 percent of borrowers reported they only had
credit life insurance coverage, 1.6 percent had only credit
accident or health insurance, and 43.4 percent of bor-
rowers stated they had both types of coverage.14. The small increase in the proportion of families with
credit insurance between 1977 and 1985 is within the
associated sampling error. Therefore, it cannot be con-
cluded that the proportion of consumers with such insur-
ance in 1985 is greaterthan the comparable proportion in
1977.
15. Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve requires that a
borrower sign an affirmative written request whenever a
borrower purchases credit insurance from a lender who
does not require s.uch insurance (12 CFR S226.4d).
16. Robert B. Averyand others, 1983 SurveyofConsumer
Finances, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System: Washington, D.C., forthcoming.
17. Hubbard(see footnote 9) reportedthat 19.7percentof
bqrro\Ners (who purchasedcredit insurance) surveyed.in
1970 state that its purchase was required by the creditor.
18. Title 1 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968;
also known as the Truth-in-Lending Act (15 USC 1605B).
REFERENCES
American Council of Life Insurance. 1985 Life Insurance
Fact E300k Update, Washington, D.C., 1986.
Coapstick, Janet and Loren W. Geistfeld. "Retail Credit
Users' Awareness of their Credit Insurance
Coverage," Journal ofConsumer Affairs, Vol. 13, No.
2, Winter, 1979.
Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate. "Hear-
ing Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopoly
and Business Rights: First Session on Credit Life
Insurance," Serial No. 96-44, Washington, D.C., 1980.
Dobson, Tracy. "Credit Insurance: The Hidden Insur-
ance," Michigan BarJournal, February 1986.
Edwards, Franklin R. "Economics of 'Tying' Arrangements:
Some Proposed Guidelines for Bank Holding Regula-
tions," Antitrust Law and Economics Review, Vol. 6,
1973.
Eisenbeis, Robert A. and Paul R. Schweitzer. "Tie-Ins
Between the Granting of Creditand Sale ofInsurance
by Bank Holding Companies and Other Lenders,"
Staff StUdy 101, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, February 1979.
20
Hubbard, Charles L., ed. Consumer Credit Life and Dis-
ability Insurance, Ohio University, 1973.
Huber, Joel. "Credit Insurance on Retail Purchases: What
Does the Public Feel?" Cambridge Reports, 2nd
Quarter, 1976.
National Association of Insurance Commissioners. "A
Background Study ofthe Regulation of Credit Life and
Disability Insurance," Milwaukee, 1970.
National Consumer Law Center, Inc. Limitation and Reg-
ulationof Credit Property Insurance, Boston, July
1978.
Scherer, F.M. Industrial Market Structure and Economic
Performance, Chicago, 1970.
Sheffey,John M. "Credit Life and Disability Insurance
Disclosures Under Truth-in-Lending: The Triumph of
Form over Substance," Florida State Law Review, Vol.
8, No. 463,1980.
Singer, Eugene. Antitrust Economics: Selected Legal
Cases andEconomic Models, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall 1968.